Are not all colors extended?
The standard construal of the a priori consists of two categories: the analytic and the synthetic. Analytic a priori judgments are said to be true by definition; we know without the confirmation of experience that all bachelors are unmarried males because the term “bachelor” is by definition an unmarried male. Another salient feature of analytic a priori judgments is that if we deny them we would be contradicting ourselves. If I were to say that some bachelors are married, I would be contradicting myself, since being a bachelor just means being a male and not married. But since analytic a priori statements are true by definition they are tautologies and therefore they don’t tell us anything about the world besides the way we define things, which, when it comes to doing substantive philosophy, is uninteresting.
Synthetic a priori judgments are said to be judgments we make about the world without the need of confirming experiences. Putative instances of valid synthetic a priori judgments include the following: that ‘nothing is wholly green and wholly red at the same time’, and ‘there are no effects without causes’. These propositions are considered synthetic as opposed to analytic because they don’t seem to be true simply by definition, e.g. whatever the project of defining the word “red” might amount to it seems irrelevant to include the relation “never coextensive with C” where C = each and every color that is not identical to red. Furthermore, and what I think is interesting, is that denying valid synthetic a priori judgments do not lead to contradictions. If I were to say that some things are both wholly red and wholly green, I would be expressing a proposition that seems to be necessarily false, but not a propositions that asserts both A and not-A.
Synthetic a priori judgments, in contrast to analytic a priori judgments, seem to be “getting at” things in the world, rather than describing features of language. When I say that ‘nothing is wholly red and wholly green at the same time’, it seems that I’m picking out a certain relationship between redness and greenness, and that their relation of never-being-coextensive is a fact about their natures. In contrast, when I say ‘all bachelors are unmarried males’ I am simply explaining the meaning of the word “bachelor”.
Now that I have briefly exposited the analytic/synthetic distinction I wish to submit a proposition as a valid synthetic a priori judgment.
(CE) Necessarily, all colors are such that they are extended.
My evidence for (CE) is simply that I can never think of colors that aren’t extended. When I put pressure on my eye and see flashes of red and yellow, or when I think of the color blue, the colors that I experience are always extended.
(CE) is synthetic and known a priori because: (1) the word “color” is not synonymous with “extension” (the synthetic criterion) and (2) because I don’t need to examine every colored thing in universe to know that everything that is colored will also be extended (the a priori criterion).
Being convinced that (CE) is true has caused me to make some significant adjustments to my ontology. Modern physics has led me to believe that color-experiences are things in the mind that are caused by a chain of events involving molecules, photons, retinas, neurons, and my mind. I must reject this theory of colors because I believe that minds are not extended, and now that I believe colors are extended, there’s no sense to notion that colors are “in my mind”.
Since I now believe that colors are extended, this also makes me a direct realist about their place in the universe. Tree trunks look brown because they are brown, not because tree bark has a certain molecular structure that (ultimately) makes me “see brown” when I look at them.
Since I believe colors are extended and are features of extended objects in the extended universe I deny the thesis that all extended objects are reducible to the atoms to which they are comprised. For, according to modern physics, atoms are not colored. But if I believe atoms are not colored, and atoms comprise the extended things in the universe, then it must be the case there are more to extended objects then their atoms- namely, their colors!
Notice, however, that just because I don’t believe extended objects are reducible to atoms to which they are (partly) comprised, this does not necessarily entail dualism. It merely means that atoms are not the only fundamental physical things in the universe.
This post is made possibly in part by the color blue.
Synthetic a priori judgments are said to be judgments we make about the world without the need of confirming experiences. Putative instances of valid synthetic a priori judgments include the following: that ‘nothing is wholly green and wholly red at the same time’, and ‘there are no effects without causes’. These propositions are considered synthetic as opposed to analytic because they don’t seem to be true simply by definition, e.g. whatever the project of defining the word “red” might amount to it seems irrelevant to include the relation “never coextensive with C” where C = each and every color that is not identical to red. Furthermore, and what I think is interesting, is that denying valid synthetic a priori judgments do not lead to contradictions. If I were to say that some things are both wholly red and wholly green, I would be expressing a proposition that seems to be necessarily false, but not a propositions that asserts both A and not-A.
Synthetic a priori judgments, in contrast to analytic a priori judgments, seem to be “getting at” things in the world, rather than describing features of language. When I say that ‘nothing is wholly red and wholly green at the same time’, it seems that I’m picking out a certain relationship between redness and greenness, and that their relation of never-being-coextensive is a fact about their natures. In contrast, when I say ‘all bachelors are unmarried males’ I am simply explaining the meaning of the word “bachelor”.
Now that I have briefly exposited the analytic/synthetic distinction I wish to submit a proposition as a valid synthetic a priori judgment.
(CE) Necessarily, all colors are such that they are extended.
My evidence for (CE) is simply that I can never think of colors that aren’t extended. When I put pressure on my eye and see flashes of red and yellow, or when I think of the color blue, the colors that I experience are always extended.
(CE) is synthetic and known a priori because: (1) the word “color” is not synonymous with “extension” (the synthetic criterion) and (2) because I don’t need to examine every colored thing in universe to know that everything that is colored will also be extended (the a priori criterion).
Being convinced that (CE) is true has caused me to make some significant adjustments to my ontology. Modern physics has led me to believe that color-experiences are things in the mind that are caused by a chain of events involving molecules, photons, retinas, neurons, and my mind. I must reject this theory of colors because I believe that minds are not extended, and now that I believe colors are extended, there’s no sense to notion that colors are “in my mind”.
Since I now believe that colors are extended, this also makes me a direct realist about their place in the universe. Tree trunks look brown because they are brown, not because tree bark has a certain molecular structure that (ultimately) makes me “see brown” when I look at them.
Since I believe colors are extended and are features of extended objects in the extended universe I deny the thesis that all extended objects are reducible to the atoms to which they are comprised. For, according to modern physics, atoms are not colored. But if I believe atoms are not colored, and atoms comprise the extended things in the universe, then it must be the case there are more to extended objects then their atoms- namely, their colors!
Notice, however, that just because I don’t believe extended objects are reducible to atoms to which they are (partly) comprised, this does not necessarily entail dualism. It merely means that atoms are not the only fundamental physical things in the universe.
This post is made possibly in part by the color blue.
Labels: epistemology, modality, ontology
posted by Derek at 1:25 AM
4 Comments:
Nice post Derek!
"Modern physics has led me to believe that color-experiences are things in the mind that are caused by a chain of events involving molecules, photons, retinas, neurons, and my mind. I must reject this theory of colors because I believe that minds are not extended, and now that I believe colors are extended, there’s no sense to notion that colors are “in my mind”. "
Don't you think though that even if you're on the right track with all this, that color experiences are things in your mind? Certainly a zombie doesn't experience color! And no doubt these experiences are caused by a chain of events involving the physical things you listed - surely no non-physical chain of events is causing you to experience color on a day-to-day basis!
You do say that there's no sense to the notion that colors are in your mind - but who's claiming that, anyway? Certainly not modern physicists, the vast majority of whom are materialists!
Don't you think though that even if you're on the right track with all this, that color experiences are things in your mind? Certainly a zombie doesn't experience color!
True, zombies don’t experience color, but this isn’t because colors are “secondary properties” or ontologically/epistemically “subjective”, but rather because zombies don’t experience anything, period. In the same way they don’t experience the color red, they also don’t experience “seeing a chair” or “watching the sunset” despite the fact the chairs and sunsets are putative physical (extended) objects/state-of-affairs. The only reason why we tend to think color-experiences are subjective entities and chairs and the-sun-setting are not is because of what physics tells us about light-waves, et cetera.
And no doubt these experiences are caused by a chain of events involving the physical things you listed - surely no non-physical chain of events is causing you to experience color on a day-to-day basis! You do say that there's no sense to the notion that colors are in your mind - but who's claiming that, anyway? Certainly not modern physicists, the vast majority of whom are materialists!
Yeah, it’s pretty strange. Perhaps I’m just unaware of the archives of evidence supporting modern theories of perception, but according to what I learned in high school, plants (specifically their chlorophyll) absorb every wave-length of light except the ones associated with green “qualia”, which ultimately cause us to “see green”, which also implies that “actually” plants which we typically call “green” are not. But really, this theory is just a watered down enlightenment theory of perception with the discussion about the mind’s role in perception completely left out. This is why most true–to-form materialists are “eliminativists” about colors, for an atoms-only ontology is colorless. But I happen to think colors exist (at least somewhere!) so I can’t be an eliminativist; and since I think they are extended (and my mind is not), I can’t think they are “ideas in the mind”, and since modern physics implies either one of these theories which I reject, it’s time for second-wave neo-Aristotelianism (at least in the ontology of colors anyway).
I want it to be clear that I am not addressing the exact thesis of your post. Rather asserting my own thesis, related to your topic and logically incompatible with select language in your text, that color experiences, like all experiences, occur in the mind, or are "had" by the mind.
The later claim, that all experiences are had by the mind, includes the claim that even experiences of physical things are had by the mind. For example, if you and your zombie doppelganger engage in a physical event side by side, like eating Coco Puffs at the same breakfast table, you (real Derek) will perceive and experience the eating of those chocolaty puffs and subsequent drinking of the chocolate milk.
But while my heart goes out to the sap, poor zombie Derek - though he is molecule-for-molecule identical to you physically - just won't be able to experience the taste of the dark, rich cereal, or experience the pain of having the roof of his mouth cut up by the overzealous mastication of the unfairly rough yet chocolaty puff-balls.
But perhaps most relevantly, zombie Derek won't be able to experience what it is like to see the brown color of the Coco Puffs. And yes it's true, poor zombie Derek can't experience the sight - or taste! - of light brown M&M's either.
He won't be able to experience anything at all in fact, as you admitted yourself when you said, "True, zombies don’t experience color, but [...] this [is] because zombies don’t experience anything, period."
And this is sadly due to the fact that he doesn't have a mind like you.
But if the mind is not physical, and experiences occur in the mind, then experiences cannot be physical. And if experiences are not physical, then color experiences cannot be physical.
You object by saying that "The only reason why we tend to think color-experiences are subjective entities and chairs and the-sun-setting are not is because of what physics tells us about light-waves, et cetera."
That is not my reason for thinking that color-experiences are subjective, or for thinking that sunsets and chairs are physical. I think that color-experiences are both subjective and non-physical because they occur in the mind, and the mind is subjective and non-physical. I think sunsets and chairs are physical, because they are extended in space and made out of atoms etc.
As to "color", it seems the term is ambiguous, as evidenced by the fact that your language in this post tends to conflate, to create a specific example, "brown-experience" with "whatever arrangements of physical objects absorb most of the wavelengths that compose the spectrum of (human-)visible light except for brown". This is not to mention the relations between the various physical objects that usually occur when color is experienced - such as a certain quantity of a certain type of light present in the first place, its velocity, the various components of an eye (cornea, retina, rods and cones, optic nerve, etc.), a functional brain, including all the components that process visual data, all the components necessary for the animal whose eye it is to be alive and "awake", including vital organs in working condition, nutrients in a certain abundance flowing through the animal's veins, the proximity of the eye to the colored object, etc. etc. etc. (note that the presence of every physical thing that typically accompanies color experience does not guarantee color experience.).
I think it might be almost necessary to cut up the situation and very specifically define what you mean by "color", and if it is truly an experiential matter that you are referring to when you say that "colors" are extended in space and physical, then I most heartily disagree, per my above articulated position that no experiences are extended in space or physical.
You make a lot of other interesting statements in this post compelling of a thorough analysis, but I chose to isolate and interact with this because it seems central to your overall message, unfortunately confused, and possible wrong-headed.
Okay, I see what you’re getting at, and I do see how I was using equivocal language when referring to colors. Instead of responding to your specific comments, I’m going to state a concise version of my theory of mind and perception as to see if we are on the same page (or at least as a means to see if you find my theory coherent).
I think all experiences are had by a mind, and this is because only the mind can have intentional content, i.e. only the mind can be conscious or be aware of things, whether physical or not. As such, whenever we talk of X-experiences, there are two things going on: there is the mind being involved with a mental state and the object that is providing the content of that mental state. In the case of colors, I’m saying it’s the mind that is experiencing colors, but the things it is experiencing are extended objects in the world. The experience is non-physical, but the objects of that experience are extended (and thereby physical). In the case of pain experiences, the mind is having a certain mental state (which is non-physical) and the content of the mental state (its object) is also non-physical. Do you have any objections to this construal?
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