that's just the way it is.
Suppose (per impossible) that time ended a moment ago. When we look back on all the facts, the principle of plenitude would tell us that that
(P) the only possibilities were what actually happened.
And (P) is equivalent to
(P)’ Whatever did not happen was not possible.
Here’s a reason to think (P)’ is true. If something else could have equally been the case that wasn’t actually the case, then there’s no sufficient reason why what actually happened happened as opposed to what could have happened. And if there’s something that happened but equally could not have happened, then there’s a feature about the world that is fundamentally inexplicable. That is, there’s some feature about the world that just is the way it is, and there’s nothing more we can say about it. That is, if (P) is true, then
(C) Something just happened for no reason.
Because (C) cannot be right (so the argument goes), and ~(P)’ implies (C), we should accept (P)’.
I think (P)’ is more absurd than (C), so I’ll gladly deny (P)’ at the cost of accepting (C).
I think most persons (philosophers included) deny (P)’ not realizing that their denial entails (C). And then, when they come to think of (C) itself independently of (P)’, they reject (C), not realizing that the denial of (C) entails (P)’. I wish these persons would make up their minds and be consistent about this.
posted by Derek at 12:28 PM
9 Comments:
It seems like the sufficient reason for what happened is found in the aggregate of free choices. How would that count as "no reason" or else make it that there were no other possibilia? Freely made decisions seem like sufficient reasons to me, and don't seem like they preclude possibilia.
So why can't we accept P', but specify the mode of possibility as something like "actual", while affirming that there were in fact possibilia of a different mode (eg. something like "real").
"How would that count as "no reason" or else make it that there were no other possibilia? Freely made decisions seem like sufficient reasons to me, and don't seem like they preclude possibilia."
Suppose it's true that Louis freely F's. That is, suppose
(F) Louis freely F's.
is true.
If (F) is true, then
~(F) Louis freely not-F's.
must be false.
Now suppose someone were to ask us: Why is (F) true as opposed to ~(F)? The only answer, it seems to me, is because (F) is true. But this answer is really just another way of saying the following: "Indeed, (F) is true. But why is (F) true as opposed ~(F)? Well, there is no reason; (F) is just the way it is, and that's all there is to say about it. ~(F) could have equally been true, but as it actually happened, (F) is true, and there's no reason (other than the truth of (F) itself) why (F) is true as opposed to ~(F)."
Of course, the truth of any proposition p is sufficient for p being true, but when people ask: "why is p true?" They're looking for some explanation of p other than p itself. They know p is true, but they think that p itself cannot be the end of the story, for "everything that happens happens for the sake of some reason", and the "reason" they have in mind here can't just be p itself. This is why I'm insisting that if there's something that happened that could have *equally* been otherwise, then there's no reason why what actually happened happened as opposed to what could have happened. To put it another way, if p is true and the truth of p is truly and unequivocally contingent, there cannot be a reason why p is true as opposed to ~p. Asserting that there is a reason why p is true as opposed to ~p and the the only reason why is that p is true is consistent with my (C) above.
"if p is true and the truth of p is truly and unequivocally contingent, there cannot be a reason why p is true as opposed to ~p."
Can you elaborate on "truly and unequivocally"?
By “truly” I mean the following: Let Q be the conjunction of every actual truth besides p itself, including any and every truth about the laws of nature, states of affairs, and God’s providential hand. To say that p is contingent is to say that the truth of Q does not in any sense whatever entail the truth of p. That is, assuming Q is true, if p is truly contingent, p is such that it at once possibly true or false. Whether p is true or false, Q had nothing to do with it. (Hence, if p is contingent, there can be no reason why p is true other than p.)
By “unequivocally” I mean the following: p is unequivocally contingent iff p is not merely dependent, for some truths can be contingent in the “dependent” sense but still nevertheless be necessary. (e.g., the truth of the statement “2+3=5” is dependent on the 2 and 3’s being such that they add up to 5, but the truth of the former is just as necessary (despite being dependent) as necessity of the latter.)
I am comfortable with saying, and even endorse, that freely made decisions are by definition antecedently insufficiently caused, or sufficiently uncaused, and that therefore they occur "without reason" by definition, given your definition of "without reason" as "truly and unequivocally contingent".
I am uncomfortable with saying that any non-decision phenomena ever occur without reason. This would result in a chaotic and unintelligible metaphysic and the destruction of the empirical sciences.
What I want to be cautious to avoid is the denial of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I think this can indeed be avoided, on y/our view, with language that carefully specifies the power of free agents to decide and thereby supply the sufficient reason for their actions. The sufficient reason for the decision itself would also be supplied by the agent on my proposal, by brute creative or generative power.
In which case I think I can affirm at least some reading of both P' and C. On my view, as I've expressed, there are no alternate actual possibilities, where "actual" references the actual state of affairs and leaves room for contingents whose values are supplied on the fly by free agents.
But C, which seems to be the option you're advocating here, also seems right. Some things happen without being antecedently sufficiently caused—namely free decisions.
I'm glad we understand each other!
"I am uncomfortable with saying that any non-decision phenomena ever occur without reason. This would result in a chaotic and unintelligible metaphysic and the destruction of the empirical sciences."
Regarding a chaotic and unintelligible metaphysic. I agree: everything (pace Hume) cannot be like this, but van Inwagen's discussion of what he calls the "distribution of evil" in that article I sent you awhile back has nearly persuaded me that *some* non-decision phenomena may indeed happen for no reason at all. [He takes it that this might just be a dark consequence of our living in a fallen world].
Please read it! I would love to know what you think!
Regarding the point that the denial of the principle of sufficient reason would destroy empirical science: doesn't our best empirical science tell us that the sub-atomic world is chaotic (at least in part)?
"*some* non-decision phenomena may indeed happen for no reason at all. [He takes it that this might just be a dark consequence of our living in a fallen world]."
I might be open to considering this, if there is a sufficient reason why such phenomena are chaotic vis-a-vis all other phenomena.
Though I'm highly skeptical any such account could even make sense. I cannot fathom would it could even mean for something to happen without sufficient reason, self-supplied or otherwise. Moreover I think I have grounds for thinking, not just that such is unfathomable as if someone with a bigger imagination could fathom it, but that it incurs whatever type of inconceivability entails impossibility.
Can you please re-send the article?
"doesn't our best empirical science tell us that the sub-atomic world is chaotic"
IHMO, no.
"'David Wallace, a philosopher of physics at the University of Oxford, UK, says that the theorem is the most important result in the foundations of quantum mechanics that he has seen in his 15-year professional career. “This strips away obscurity and shows you can’t have an interpretation of a quantum state as probabilistic,” he says." - Nature
H/T James Gibson
I read one of the papers you sent, and responded here.
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