Maybe. But maybe not.
To affirm that
(A) everything happens for a reason,
or to affirm that
(B) there is one thing that did not happen for a reason,
is to presume an epistemic position that only God is currently occupying. Since you’re not God, you’re not in his epistemic position. Therefore, stop affirming (A) or (B). Instead you should say: “Maybe (A) or maybe (B), but what do I know? I’m not God.” Therefore, maybe (A) or maybe (B).
(A) everything happens for a reason,
or to affirm that
(B) there is one thing that did not happen for a reason,
is to presume an epistemic position that only God is currently occupying. Since you’re not God, you’re not in his epistemic position. Therefore, stop affirming (A) or (B). Instead you should say: “Maybe (A) or maybe (B), but what do I know? I’m not God.” Therefore, maybe (A) or maybe (B).
posted by Derek at 10:13 PM
3 Comments:
SHoot! Andrew, I accidentally deleted your comment and not my response. Could you repost it?
Hmm, I believe I said something like this:
There are valid *arguments* for, say, (B). And it seems to me that one needn't be in a God-like epistemic position to reasonably believe the premises of those arguments. There just has to be *enough* evidence for those premises. One then need only conclude that (B) is false on the basis of those premises, and it looks like belief in (B) will be reasonable too. Nothing mysterious and God-like there; it's just philosophy!
That should read: "conclude that (B) is true"
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