Saturday, July 02, 2011

a reductio of classical moral psychology?

If one could intentionally and knowingly commit a horrendous evil, then one could intentionally and knowingly eat poop. But no one can intentionally and knowingly eat poop. Therefore, no one could intentionally and knowingly commit a horrendous evil.

p = one could intentionally and knowingly commit a horrendous evil.
q = one could intentionally and knowingly eat poop.

(1) p ⊃ q
(2) ~q
(3) ∴ ~p

If no one could intentionally and knowingly commit a horrendous evil, then no one who commits a horrendous evil is morally responsible for the horrendous evil she commits.

r = no one who commits a horrendous evil is morally responsible for the horrendous evil she commits.

(4) ~p ⊃ r
(3) ~p
(5) ∴ r

John Wayne Gacy Jr. committed a horrendous evil. Therefore, John Wayne Gacy Jr. is not responsible for the horrendous evil he commited.

r = No [one who commits a horrendous evil] is [that which is morally responsible for the horrendous evil she commits].
(7) All [John Wayne Gacy Jr.] is [one who commits a horrendous evil].
(8) No [John Wayne Gacy Jr.] is [that which is responsible for the horrendous evil he commits].

This argument is valid.


So if you think is (8) is false (i.e., that John Wayne Gacy Jr. is in some way morally responsible for at least one of the horrendous evils he committed), then you must deny at least one of premises (1) through (7). Which one would you deny, and for what reason?

I’d deny (2). I think it’s possible that someone can intentionally and knowingly eat poop. As crazy as that may seem, I think it’s infinitely less crazy than (8)! And therefore, etc.

I suspect that most people would deny (1). Though I have no independent argument for it, I’m confident that anyone who thinks long and hard about (1) will see that it’s true.

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