### fatalism and divine foreknowledge.

~p ↔ Fp

~(p ^ ~p)

p v ~p

∴ Tp v Fp

Is this argument valid? If so, bivalence follows the conjunction of a semantic non-contradiction and excluded middle. Assuming that propositions designating any (and all) future times are propositions (a modest thesis, if any is), logical fatalism is not different in kind than the problem of divine foreknowledge and (libertarian) freewill.

Here’s my parity argument:

If the above argument is valid, then anyone who affirms:

(1) (semantic) non-contradiction.

(2) excluded middle.

and that

(3) There is some future time t1 where I have the power to either F or not F,

is inconsistent with herself.

And according to the problem of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will, anyone who affirms that

(3) God knows right now that I will F at some future time t1.

and

(4) I have the power to either F or not F at t1,

is inconsistent with herself.

Well, so be it. Let it be that anyone who holds the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3) is inconsistent with herself, and let it be the case that anyone who holds the conjunction of (3) and (4) is inconsistent with herself. Well, despite the inconsistency of (1), (2), and (3), one is rational for affirming all three of them at once. And since one is rational in affirming (1), (2), and (3) all at once, so too is one who affirms both (3) and (4). Therefore, one who holds to (3) and (4) is rational.

## 2 Comments:

Seems not to respect modality at all, am I wrong?

That seems right.

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