I believe that at least one substance exists necessarily, but my belief is held in a basic way.
(That at least one substance exists necessarily isn't a narrowly logically necessary truth, nor does it follow from any narrowly logically necessary truth. It and the claim that, possibly, necessarily, there is at least one substance do seem to me to be broadly logically necessary truths, but I have no evidence whatever for these claims- I simply find myself believing them.)
As such, it's quite easy for me to suppose its negation and ask: "could there be the passage of time and nothing else?" in a way that I cannot suppose the negation of any narrowly logically necessary truths and ask the same question.
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No, because at least one substance exists necessarily.
I believe that at least one substance exists necessarily, but my belief is held in a basic way.
(That at least one substance exists necessarily isn't a narrowly logically necessary truth, nor does it follow from any narrowly logically necessary truth. It and the claim that, possibly, necessarily, there is at least one substance do seem to me to be broadly logically necessary truths, but I have no evidence whatever for these claims- I simply find myself believing them.)
As such, it's quite easy for me to suppose its negation and ask: "could there be the passage of time and nothing else?" in a way that I cannot suppose the negation of any narrowly logically necessary truths and ask the same question.
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