Sunday, November 20, 2011

on the Dark Ages.

“If we say we have not sinned, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

Since the Fall there have been (at least) three kinds of Dark Ages.

The first kind is the Enlightened Dark Age. This is the Dark Age that realizes its own darkness.

The Dark Age of the Second Order is the age that understands what a Dark Age is but fails to realize that it is in one.

The third, or Darkest Age, is the age that is not only unaware of its own darkness, but it has completely forgotten what a Dark Age is.

“Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. I did not come to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance.


Could it be that, with the work of Christ in place, the necessary and sufficient condition for saving faith is the act of choosing to see myself as I am?

(We must not forget asking for forgiveness and repentance, but in the natural order of things these simply follow choosing to see one's self in the presence of Christ.)


Thursday, November 17, 2011

why do I find it so hard

to write the next line?

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Monday, November 14, 2011

on being "scientific".

This is more absurd than anything Aristotle ever said, and apparently this absurdity is a consequence of our best science. If that's true, so much the worse for our best science.

Saturday, November 12, 2011

that's just the way it is.

Suppose (per impossible) that time ended a moment ago. When we look back on all the facts, the principle of plenitude would tell us that that

(P) the only possibilities were what actually happened.

And (P) is equivalent to

(P)’ Whatever did not happen was not possible.

Here’s a reason to think (P)’ is true. If something else could have equally been the case that wasn’t actually the case, then there’s no sufficient reason why what actually happened happened as opposed to what could have happened. And if there’s something that happened but equally could not have happened, then there’s a feature about the world that is fundamentally inexplicable. That is, there’s some feature about the world that just is the way it is, and there’s nothing more we can say about it. That is, if (P) is true, then

(C) Something just happened for no reason.

Because (C) cannot be right (so the argument goes), and ~(P)’ implies (C), we should accept (P)’.

I think (P)’ is more absurd than (C), so I’ll gladly deny (P)’ at the cost of accepting (C).

I think most persons (philosophers included) deny (P)’ not realizing that their denial entails (C). And then, when they come to think of (C) itself independently of (P)’, they reject (C), not realizing that the denial of (C) entails (P)’. I wish these persons would make up their minds and be consistent about this.

on [the state of] human nature.

The “close door” button on elevators doesn’t work until after the door fully opens.

(A) Had the “close door” button worked before the elevator door fully opens, then someone would have illicitly prevented another person from entering the elevator.

(B) Had the apple rolled off the table, then it would be on the ground.

Why am I more sure of the truth of (A) than (B) despite the fact that I think the persons that would make (A) true are not necessitated to do what they do in the way that I think the things that would make (B) true are necessitated to do what they do?

Monday, November 07, 2011

maybe.

Should I still call it an “undertow” if it’s up to my chin?

Thursday, November 03, 2011

for the Devil's advocate.

“God wants to dispose the will more than the mind. Perfect clarity would serve the mind and harm the will.”

Pascal

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